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 ECHOES OF ANCIENT ETHOS: REFLECTIONS ON SOME POPULAR 
BHUTANESE SOCIAL THEMES 
KARMA PHUNTSHO 
 few years ago, a man was interviewed on radio asking why he 
became a soldier. He replied: “To serve the Tsawasum with tha 
damtshig”. When asked what the Tsawasum are, he enumerated 
army, bodyguards and police force. Similarly, teacher-trainees at the 
National Institute of Education were asked in an exam to name the 
Tsawasum. Some wrote the names of their three best friends. These 
anecdotes amply show (1) that concepts such as Tsawasum and tha 
damtshig are very profusely bandied about in Bhutan and (2) that most 
people take them for granted without any accurate knowledge of their 
significance. Even among those who grasp their significance, their 
frequency and ubiquity have rendered the weighty concepts meaningless 
catchphrases. It is these socio-political concepts – Tsawasum, tha damtshig, 
le judre, driglam namzha, and Gyalyong gakyi palzom – their historical 
origins, significance, usage, implications and underlying assumptions 
which I shall attempt to explore briefly. 
A
I am a philosopher by training, and particularly a student of 
Buddhist ontology and epistemology. Therefore, I am fully aware that in 
undertaking this study I am venturing into a domain beyond my own 
expertise. Hence, I make no claims to offer original ideas or penetrating 
insights into these themes. Nevertheless, it is my philosophical 
inclination and interest in the affairs of home, which give me the impetus 
to reflect on these topics of great significance and popularity. 
I concur with Bertrand Russell in maintaining that philosophers are 
both effects and causes of their host societies, ‘effects of their social 
circumstances and of the politics and institutions of their time; causes (if 
they are fortunate) of beliefs which mould the politics and institutions of 
later ages’. A successful philosopher, in Bertrand Russell’s words, ‘is a 
person in whom are crystallized and concentrated thoughts and feelings 
which, in a vague and diffused form, are common to the community of 
which he is part’.1 Unfortunately, I cannot claim to be such a fortunate or 
successful philosopher but I surely cannot deny being an image cast in 
the mould of the Bhutanese socio-cultural milieu and political situation 
insofar as my personality, attitude, outlook and viewpoints have been 
shaped, en rapport or otherwise, by the prevailing socio-cultural and 
political circumstances. 
                                                          
1 Russell (2001), p. 7 
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Thus, it is the highly influential status of these concepts in the 
traditional Bhutanese society and in particular the recent promotion of 
these with political overtones, which compel me to engage in the 
following discussion. My urge is indeed further enhanced by the patriotic 
impulse of being a conscious and responsible member of the tradition 
and society concerned. This is however not to suggest that this study, 
motivated by a patriotic zeal, is going to be an emotional and prescriptive 
discourse rather than a rational and descriptive analysis. I aim to 
undertake, using a conglomerate of philosophical, historical, sociological 
and anthropological approaches, an analytical discussion of the themes, 
unaffected by any linear or particularistic stance. 
By the same token, this is not to be construed as a calculated critique 
of either the social norms or the state policies and practices in vogue but a 
systematic scrutiny of the religious, ethical and political dimensions of 
the themes in question. My main aim is to take the discussion of these 
themes to a higher philosophical and analytical level and thereby attempt 
to reveal the underlying assumptions. Should such ‘philosophization’ 
and the critical approach universal to academia reveal or reiterate any 
discontinuity, inconsistency or contradiction either between the original 
purport and later interpretations, between principle and practice or 
between reality and rhetoric, such I hope will be seen as findings of 
constructive value. Much of the time, I shall be only asking questions, the 
art of which my mentors in academia taught me as the very first lesson. 
As far as possible, I shall also try to integrate into my reflections the 
concerns of other like-minded Bhutanese, whose voices this discussion 
ought to echo. 
It is perhaps appropriate at the very outset to state two salient 
features of the themes to be discussed: (1) they are originally religious or 
para-religious concepts and (2) they acquired, mostly in recent years, a 
secular and political dimension to their application. The discussion thus 
spans from the origination of these concepts as moral principles 
understood within the parameters of a given religious system, to the 
process of secularisation at later stages. I shall now turn to discuss the 
two stages of development for each of these concepts in the order of their 
probable historical sequence. 
Le Judre 
Le judre (las rgyu ’bras) or the law of karmic cause and effect certainly 
figures as a concept of great antiquity. Pappu traces the origin of karma 
to the ta ⎝rta and in i aap⎝rta in the Rig Veda, which is the earliest of the 
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four Vedas.2 O’Flaherty conjectures that the concept of karma could have 
preceded the belief in rebirth.3 Obeyesekere, on the other hand, 
hypothesises that the theory of karma developed from the theory of 
rebirth through a process of speculative activity which he labels 
‘ethicization’.4 He argues that the theory of rebirth could have flourished 
among the tribals of the Gangetic plans just as it is widely spread among 
different tribals in many parts of the world and that Hindu, Buddhist, 
and Jain thinkers transformed this ‘rebirth eschatology into karmic 
eschatology’. Whatever the origins, the theory of karma forms the ground 
rule for all major religious systems of Indic origin including Brahminism, 
Buddhism and Jainism. A great number of both classical and secondary 
literature on karma is available, hence, for the present purpose I shall 
only draw upon few authoritative Buddhist texts to demonstrate the 
nature, significance and ramifications of the law of karma in the Indo-
Tibetan Buddhist tradition from which our concept of le judre is derived. 
Le judre, it should be noted, is a subject which tradition believes is so 
vast and abstruse so that only the omniscient Buddha can fully fathom it.5 
Hence, a few paragraphs of discussion will hardly do it any justice. My 
intention here is to provide only a synopsis of karma as a moral and 
ethical principle. A comprehensive treatment of the metaphysical 
theories of karmic mechanism has been carried out elsewhere.6
                                                          
2 Pappu (1987), p. 1: He describes ♦ta as ‘the principle of cosmic order which controls, unifies, and 
orders all phenomena’, and i•aap⎝rta as ‘the payment made to the priest for performance of a 
sacrifice and obtaining merit’. 
3 O’Flaherty (1980), p. 3 
4 Obeyesekere (1980), p. 138 
5 See, for instance, Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra (1981), vol. ii, p. 1222 for Rāhulabhadra’s verse 
which Vasubandhu quotes: 
sarvakara∝ kara⎞am ekasya may⎝racandrakasyapi / 
nasarvajñair jñeya∝ sarvajñabala∝ hi tajjñanam // 
 
rma bya’i gdongs ni gcig la yang / / rgyu yi rnam pa thams cad ni / / 
kun mkhyen min pas shes bya min / / de shes kun mkhyen stobs yin no // 
 
The multiplicity of causes 
For [producing] even a single peacock feather  
Is not conceivable by [those who are] not omniscient. 
Knowing [all about] it is the power of Omniscience [only]. 
 
See also ⎢Shantideva’s remark in Bodhicaryavatara, IV/7 
vetti sarvajaa evaitam acintya∝ karma⎞o gatim / 
las tshul bsam gyis mi khyab pa / / thams cad mkhyen pa kho nas mkhyen / / 
The Omniscient one alone knows 
The inconceivable nature of karma. 
6 Phuntsho (1998) 
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The Buddha taught a voluntaristic theory of karma proclaiming 
karma to be intention. Speaking against the Brahminical and Jain theories 
of karma as physical and material phenomena, he declared, “O Monks! 
Karma, I declare, is intention. Having intended, the body, speech and 
mind perform action”.7 According to the Buddha, good and bad karma 
are not defined by the physical appearance and verbal speech but by 
intention. It is virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral intentions, which 
determine actions to be virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral. The three 
kinds of actions then bring respectively happiness, suffering or no 
results.  
The Buddha rejected the deterministic doctrine of the Brahminical 
religion, which taught karma as social duty determined by caste and sex. 
Maintaining karma qua intention to be the main moral determinant, he 
used the moral and spiritual values people adopted in their life as the 
yardstick to judge their virtue and social status. This ethical voluntarism 
of the Buddha has been reiterated throughout the ages by subsequent 
Buddhist savants such as Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and Candrakīrti.8 
Corollary to such ethical philosophy, the Buddha and his followers 
professed a social egalitarianism whereby all persons are equal 
irrespective of their caste, race and sex. 
Crucial to the theory of karma as intention is then the distinction 
between virtuous and non-virtuous intentions. Like the issue of good and 
bad, and right and wrong in normative ethics, the question of what 
constitutes virtuous and non-virtuous intention is a vital and complex 
issue in Buddhism. Suffice here to cite Nāgārjuna who formulates the 
distinction between virtuous and non-virtuous intention in the following 
verse: 
’dod chags zhe sdang gti mug gsum / / des bskyed las ni mi dge ba / /ma 
chags ma sdang gti mug med / / des bskyed las ni dge ba ’o / / 
Actions motivated by attachment, hatred and ignorance are non-
virtuous. 
Actions motivated by non-attachment, non-hatred, non-ignorance 
are virtuous.9
Buddhist thinkers such as Nāgārjuna, philosophising in a strictly 
spiritual and soteriological context, argued that any action motivated by 
thoughts contaminated with the three poisonous emotions of attachment, 
hatred and delusion are non-virtuous and negative, whereas actions 
                                                          
7 A≡guttaranikaya, iii, 415: “cetanaha∝ bhikkhave kamma∝ vadami, cetayitva kamma∝ karoti 
kayena vacaya manasa / 
8 Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamkakārikā, XVIII/ 2-3; Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, IV/1, Candrakīrti, 
Madhyamakāvatāra, VI/89 
9 Nāgārjuna, Ratnaval×, I/20: 
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motivated by their three antidotal impulses are positive and virtuous. 
The latter are considered good because they bring forth happiness, and 
the former are considered evil as they entail suffering as their result. 
Thus, Buddhist thinkers propounded an axiological and teleological form 
of moral philosophy with subjective volition at its heart. This theory of 
karma as intention/volition and the law of corresponding causation that 
virtue causes happiness and non-virtuous actions cause suffering form 
the foundations of the edifice that is the Buddhist soteriological and 
ethical system. 
Now, the law of karma, in spite of its philosophical profundity and 
practical complexity, is one of the most popular religious concepts. It is 
not merely an intellectual topic broached by philosophers and scholars 
but a belief espoused by the masses. In Bhutan, the law of karma often 
referred to as le judre or just le, certainly features as a very popular 
religious concept. People view it as an infallible law of virtuous actions 
leading to happiness and happy rebirth and non-virtuous actions leading 
to suffering and unhappy rebirth. When and where such conviction is 
fickle, several kinds of religious teachings and practices are also adopted 
to instil constant awareness of and steadfast certainty about the 
infallibility of the law. Giving it a role akin to that of God in theistic 
religions, le judre is also feared and seen as both the explanation for the 
past and present state of being and the answer for the future. To be a 
moral man is to abide by le judre through engaging in virtuous actions 
and eschewing non-virtuous actions. ‘To have no [regard for] le judre’ (las 
rgyu ’bras med pa) is to be morally unconscientious, irresponsible and 
reckless. 
The application of le judre in recent years however found new socio-
political ramifications, which diverged from the original religious 
purport. It acquired a new political dimension whereby regard for le judre 
got confounded with political loyalty and submission to the ruling power 
or zhung (gzhung). Those lacking loyalty and commitment to the 
government were often described as not having le judre because of their 
lack of the sense of political obligation and duty. It is this secondary 
application with a nationalistic interest that I call here secularised le judre. 
The main shift from the original spiritual purport to this secularised 
use is in taking mental attitudes such as loyalty and gratitude to the state 
and the sovereign as intrinsically positive and in not placing virtuous and 
non-virtuous intention defined by the three positive and poisonous 
emotions at the centre of le judre. From a strictly Buddhist psychological 
viewpoint, loyalty and gratitude, like regret and zeal, are classified as 
neutral attitudes and are not virtues per se. Regret after doing a bad thing 
and zeal for a good cause are virtuous while regretting a good deed and 
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zeal in an evil project are non-virtuous. Likewise, the moral qualities of 
loyalty and gratitude are determined by their object and purpose; 
pledging loyalty and gratitude are not inherently virtuous actions and 
proper observance of le judre or the vice versa. 
Furthermore, certain acts which can be considered admirable and 
noble deeds in secular and worldly respects can contradict the Buddhist 
theory of le judre. Killing even in defence of the country, for instance, is a 
non-virtuous act motivated by hatred instigated by attachment and thus 
against the first Buddhist precept of not taking life. Vasubandhu, an 
authority on Buddhist ethics, even goes so far as to argue that every 
member of battalion would incur the negative deed of taking a human 
life when one soldier from the battalion kills an enemy.10 These examples 
suffice to demonstrate that allegiance and loyalty to the state and 
government is not necessarily consonant with the Buddhist observance of 
le judre, and confounding le judre with political loyalty is an aberration 
from the original concept. Although in actual use, the distinction between 
the le judre which is a pure religious principle and the le judre with 
political connotation is blurred, there is certainly a serious disjunction 
between the two. 
Tha Damtshig 
The concept of tha damtshig, like le judre, has an Indian origin. In its 
religious application, the Tibetan term dam tshig is used to translate the 
Sanskrit word samaya and refers to the precepts of tantric practice. Giving 
its etymological explanation, scholars describe damtshig as a pledge 
which ought not be transgressed (’da’ bar bya ba ma yin pa’i tshig). It 
denotes the many general (spyi), special (khyad par) and extraordinary 
(lhag pa) do’s and don’ts an initiate is required to observe after receiving 
tantric initiations. Thus, it is mostly used in connection with esoteric 
tantric Buddhism rather than with philosophical sūtra Buddhism, in 
which equivalent terms such as sdom pa and bslab pa are commonly used. 
The damtshig of tantric practices include a great number of 
obligatory precepts ranging from obeying one’s guru and loving all 
fellow beings to performing ceremonies at the right time. Tantras also 
vary in the number and type of damtshig. The Kālacakra cycle, for 
instance, proclaims fourteen primary damtshig and numerous minor ones 
while others such as the Guhyagarbha have five primary and many 
auxiliary ones. Damtshig, as a solemn oath and code of practice for the 
highly revered and esoteric form of Buddhism, is seen with much awe 
and fear. The proper observance of damtshig rewards the practitioner 
                                                          
10 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, V/72 
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with swift enlightenment but an infringement of it is said to cause rebirth 
in the deepest hell. Hence, the tantric path with its solemn damtshig is 
often compared to trapping a snake in a bamboo stem. There are only 
two polar exits. Damtshig is also seen as a binding force, which keeps the 
community or line of practitioners spiritually pure and soteriologically 
effective. Persons who have violated damtshig, especially by opposing 
their guru, are considered to be spiritually dysfunctional and corrupt and 
often excommunicated from the community of practitioners. 
The religious understanding of damtshig as tantric precepts however 
got extended to several social and moral notions, attitudes and 
behaviours in worldly use. Supplied with the prefix tha (mtha’), taken 
from las kyi mtha’ and denoting moral limitation or boundary, damtshig 
acquired a range of social meanings. It may also be noted that tha 
damtshig is used more frequently in Bhutan than in other Himalayan 
countries and done so mostly in a social context. 
Tha damtshig, depending on the context, covers a wide range of 
referents including honesty, fidelity, moral integrity, moral rectitude, 
moral coherence, reciprocal affection, gratitude, filial piety, etc. To say a 
shopkeeper did not have tha damtshig when she overcharged or 
manipulated the scales meant the shopkeeper lacked honesty. A spouse 
with no tha damtshig generally referred to a lack of marital fidelity while 
tha damtshig in connection with teacher-student and master-servant 
relations usually referred to kindness, respect, gratitude and loyalty. 
Among family and friends, it denotes affection, a feeling of kinship and 
sense of obligation. A person generally described as not possessing tha 
damtshig is someone lacking personal integrity and moral rectitude, and 
an act lacking tha damtshig is one which is unethical. An important social 
concept, tha damtshig thus has a wide range of referents and applications. 
It is however not my intention here to delve into these nuances and 
connotations. This brief survey will, I hope, provide an adequate 
backdrop against which to discuss the recent use of tha damtshig with a 
political connotation. 
By recent use, I am referring to the application of tha damtshig in a 
socio-political context, in which persons who failed to remain loyal to the 
state and the government were seen as persons without tha damtshig. Tha 
damtshig in this case is confounded with political loyalty and allegiance to 
the government. Just as there is the damtshig bond among a religious 
group and tha damtshig ties within families and friends, a political bond is 
perceived between the people and the government. 
The government plays the role of the senior party and is to be seen 
as an object of service and gratitude whereas the individual citizens are 
considered as the recipients of social benefit, who ought to be obedient 
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and grateful. Partly a relic of the past social stratification, this notion of 
the government as a superior entity to be respected and served instead of 
an administrative body to represent and serve the people still dominates 
the Bhutanese perception of government. 
In this context, to breach the political bond by displaying 
disobedience and revoking one’s political allegiance is seen as lacking tha 
damtshig. This interpretation of tha damtshig with a political and 
nationalistic overtone has gained currency especially after the ‘anti-
national’ movements in the southern and eastern districts of the country 
towards the end of the last century. Persons who went against the 
government and state, irrespective of their moral stance and observance 
of tha damtshig in all other senses, were branded as lacking tha damtshig. 
This leads us to the imperative of defining the importance of the 
various moral obligations and social contracts an individual can have vis-
à-vis his/her religious master, family, friends and ruler. Which of the tha 
damtshig: the religious bond with the guru and colleagues, the social ties 
with family and friends, or political allegiance, should receive priority? 
The answer perforce is bound to vary from one individual to another 
depending on variant backgrounds and circumstantial reasons and no 
unitary and arbitrary answer can prove viable under proper scrutiny. 
Similarly, should tha damtshig be defined more by socio-political 
obligations and considerations than by personal integrity and moral 
rectitude? Should not social vices such as misappropriation, nepotism 
and other forms of corruption and poor work discipline, which 
constantly mar Bhutanese bureaucracy, be reckoned as grave a neglect of 
tha damtshig as disobedience and defiance of authority? In the face of 
sweeping materialism and the social vices such as corruption, nepotism 
and power abuse, is it not tha damtshig qua moral dignity and ethical 
conscientiousness which we need most, rather than tha damtshig as 
zealous and sycophantic loyalty? In raising these issues, I am not 
questioning the moral rectitude of our bureaucrats or proposing the 
preference of one form of tha damtshig over the others. Neither am I being 
cynical about social contracts, a subject which Uni Wikan and Adam Pain 
has touched during the conference. My intention is merely to stimulate a 
thorough going discussion of the wide ranging nuances, interpretations 
and applications of tha damtshig with a hope to unpack the complexities 
of so popular and important a concept. 
Driglam Namzha 
Unlike le judre and tha damtshig, the origin of driglam namzha is not 
bound by a religious context. Neither is the recent promotion of driglam 
namzha a politicised aberration of religious concepts as is the case with 
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the two earlier concepts, but a formal reinforcement of what was 
previously a diffused and spontaneous tradition. Drig (sgrigs) denotes 
order, conformity and uniformity. Thus driglam literally means the way 
or path (lam) having order and uniformity while namzha (rnam gzhag) 
refers to concept or system. Driglam namzha is thus a system of ordered 
and cultured behaviour, and by extension, the standards and rules to this 
effect. Whitecross, following Karma Ura, has rendered driglam namzha as 
“the way of conscious order” or “the way of conscious harmony”.11 They 
seem to have confounded namzha – concept or system – with rnam shes – 
consciousness. 
Driglam namzha is not concerned as much with moral and ethical 
do’s and don’ts, right or wrong and the philosophical theories thereof as 
is le judre or tha damtshig. It deals with more mundane issues of physical 
and verbal comportment determined as crude or courteous by the 
specific social and cultural contexts. Thus, as a concept of orderly good 
manners and uniform behaviour, it is a human concept universal to all 
societies and ages. However, in claiming the universality of good 
manners, I am not holding manners to be etic. Manners, like many socio-
cultural things, is emic bound by culture and viable in specific social 
circumstances. Thus, the concept of etiquette is determined by cultural 
contexts. 
Tradition claims the Bhutanese driglam to have started with the 
Buddhist vinaya just as damtshig originated in the tantras. For instance, 
comportments such as chuckling while you eat and prancing while you 
walk, which Bhutanese driglam considers unbecoming for a cultured 
person, are described in the vinaya as behavioural flaws to be eschewed 
by the monks. The highly regulated, disciplined and routinized life of the 
monks and nuns also sufficiently demonstrates how monastic life 
epitomises the practice of drig, true to the saying: Grwa pa sdrig gis ’tsho – 
Monks survive by rules. Thus, good manners in the Bhutanese context is 
to a great extent what Buddhist codes of physical, verbal and mental 
conducts dictate as proper and wholesome. In particular, the codes of 
practice which Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel introduced in the central 
monk body and in other monastic and administrative centres are largely 
based on the code of etiquette known among Tibetan Buddhist clergy 
and elites. 
Although the origin of driglam can be attributed to Buddhist ethical 
practices, it is however difficult to speculate if any form of organized and 
institutionalised practice of driglam existed in Bhutan before the 
Zhabdrung. The Zhabdrung and his immediate circle perhaps can be 
                                                          
11 Whitecross (2002), p. 88. See Ura (1997), p. 247 
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rightly credited with the earliest implementation of driglam as a formal 
practice at an institutional level. Nonetheless, it may be an exaggeration 
to argue that all Bhutanese driglam and etiquette originated with the 
Zhabdrung as some people have ventured to speculate. One certainly 
cannot deny that driglam, in the form of loose and informal adoption of 
proper behaviour and manners, existed even before the Zhabdrung and 
his establishment of organised institutions. 
The first major modern discussion on driglam is perhaps the 
deliberation and the subsequent resolution passed during the 20th session 
of the National Assembly in 1963 requiring all Bhutanese to wear 
complete Bhutanese dress during formal occasions.12 Nonetheless, the 
first occurrence of the term driglam namzha seems to be during the 51st 
session in 1979.13 With the onslaught of modernization and the insidious 
invasion of western culture, particularly among the youth, in the 1980s, 
the need to preserve Bhutanese driglam namzha became a national 
imperative and the issue surfaced frequently in the National Assembly. 
Linked with national identity, driglam namzha acquired a new political 
significance. The growing concern about the decline of Bhutanese 
customs and the need for strengthening driglam namzha culminated in the 
royal decree of 16 January 1989, a milestone in the history of driglam 
namzha. The late 80s thus marked the beginning of a systematic 
promotion of driglam namzha, particularly with the enforcement of the 
national dress. This period and subsequent years also saw the rise of both 
genuine awareness of driglam namzha and the ubiquitous and often 
hypocritical reiteration of it. 
The serious concern that His Majesty, the King had regarding the 
fate of Bhutanese tradition in the face of rapid process of modernization 
at home and globalizing trend in the world at large, echoed across the 
upper strata of Bhutanese bureaucracy. However, for some, driglam 
namzha became a political catchphrase. The rhetorical and repetitious use 
of driglam namzha turned the issue into an empty slogan. I still remember 
an expatriate in 1986 criticising a senior official who visited schools 
giving lectures on the importance of Bhutanese tradition and language 
but had his children studying outside Bhutan with no knowledge of 
either the tradition or the language. 
The qualms about declining tradition and lack of driglam namzha 
came simultaneously with the worry about increasing western influence 
on the Bhutanese people. This decline in the practice of Bhutanese 
etiquette and the acquisition of modern western influences occurred 
                                                          
12 National Assembly Secretariat, (1998), vol. i, p. 129 
13 Ibid., vol. II, p. 13 
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mostly among the rising bureaucratic class and the affluent section of 
urban population. Ironically, the criticism regarding the deterioration of 
driglam namzha was also mainly voiced by the same people. The rural 
population on the whole was outside this arena being neither the critic 
nor targets of criticism. The call for driglam namzha and dzongkha and the 
complaints about modern western influences were criticisms of which the 
actual targets were mostly the circles of critics themselves. It was thus 
what Karma Ura calls ‘a deflected criticism’.14
Furthermore, in spite of the constant reiteration of the problem of 
driglam, many professed promulgators of driglam namzha failed to address 
it even among their immediate circles. This consequently gave rise to 
suspicions and accusations of double standards in the implementation of 
driglam namzha and of using it as window dressing. The problem of the 
apparent double standard however is embedded in the tradition of 
driglam itself. In a situation where an inferior Bhutanese interacts with a 
senior one, driglam requires the inferior and younger to be refined and 
restrained in the presence of a senior while the senior person could enjoy 
the freedom of ease and comfort. It is not generally the case of exemplary 
manners, in which good manners are shown by superior and older 
people so as to inspire and impress the lower and younger ones, as it 
ideally should be and appears to be the case with comparable traditions 
like gentleman’s manners in Britain. This trait of Bhutanese driglam seem 
to negatively affect the upper echelons of society in learning and 
inculcating driglam namzha, leaving them less cultured and experienced 
than persons from lesser backgrounds. 
At about the same time, the perception and understanding of driglam 
namzha also began to change. While on one hand, driglam namzha 
continued to be used as a political rhetoric, on the other, it saw an 
unprecedented codification and systematisation. The last decade saw the 
publication of three different books on driglam namzha as well as the 
introduction of new norms such as the tshoglam rule. Driglam namzha 
came to be viewed more and more as the formal and structured display 
of official etiquette rather than as the fluid and spontaneous practice of 
good manners. Concerted efforts were made to systematise and 
standardise existent practices as well as to invent new ones. Driglam 
namzha was increasingly perceived as a social skill, which like other 
professional skills has be learnt through formal lessons from a qualified 
instructor instead of seeing it as good manners which can be inculcated 
by one’s association with cultured people. In this way, driglam became 
increasingly an official idiom and became distanced from the concept of 
                                                          
14 Personal communication 
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good conduct in everyday life. It became associated with court behaviour 
and a structured set of conduct during official events. This formalisation 
and reification of what were formerly loose and spontaneous forms of 
refined comportment in different facets of life elevated driglam to the 
status of a systematic concept. It became a formal system, as the word 
namzha denotes. 
It is in such systematisation, standardization and ‘invention of 
tradition’ that we can see the divergence of the former concept of driglam 
and the latter system of driglam namzha. Whitecross shows this distinction 
by contrasting driglam namzha and beyzha (sbe/’bad bzhag), a word which 
denotes manners without any connotation of formalization. He correctly 
highlights the importance of beyzha in daily life more than the 
systematized driglam namzha. However, in portraying beyzha as a 
behavioural concept, he also runs the risk of reifying and formalizing 
beyzha.15
The real spirit and beauty of driglam qua etiquette lies in the 
spontaneous practice and inner appreciation of it as wholesome conduct. 
Formalization and enforcement of it kills this spirit turning it into 
mechanical acts of obligation and duty. The arbitrary extension of 
tradition and customs both temporally and spatially can only yield a 
superficial impact and not an ingrained tradition. Tradition is an 
evolving phenomenon. It is not a static entity but a flux and its course of 
development, like fashion, is decided by what is right at the time. To hold 
onto to an out-dated custom which time has rendered ineffective and 
unappealing or to wilfully invent and introduce prematurely a new 
tradition are both to interfere in the natural course of tradition, and 
therefore rob tradition of its beauty and purpose. 
Moreover, the imposition of one tradition across the board and the 
standardization of numerous variants destroy the diversity and the 
spontaneity of traditions. Have we then in the course of formalization on 
the one hand and through the rhetorical use on the other defeated the 
very purpose of driglam namzha qua good manners?  
Tsawasum 
Tsawasum (rtsa ba gsum), literally means the three roots or 
foundations. The tantric Buddhist Tsawasum refer to the triad of guru or 
bla ma, devatā or yi dam and ∂ākinī or mkha’ ’gro. They are roots because 
they serve as sources of blessings, attainments and activities respectively. 
Thus, Tsawasum in tantric Buddhism form a crucial category similar to 
the Three Jewels in general Buddhism and the concepts of trinity in other 
                                                          
15 Whitecross (2002), p. 71 
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religions. The Tsawasum to be discussed here however is an altogether 
different category although there is no doubt that the terminology has 
been appropriated from the tantric religious triad. 
The first mention of Tsawasum with the socio-political referents 
appears in the Khrims gzhung chen mo first written in the 1950s. In the 
Khrims gzhung chen mo, the Country, King and Government are 
mentioned as Tsawasum.16 Dasho Singkhar Lam however remarks that 
the third King’s intention was to enumerate the Government, Country 
and People as Tsawasum.17 The third King, he recollects, reasoned that the 
King, as a part of the government, need not be separated from the 
government. In addition to these two textual and oral versions of 
reckoning Tsawasum, there is the recent enumeration of Tsawasum 
comprising the King, Country and People.18
Although the concept of Tsawasum started in the 1950s, it did not 
figure as popular a concept then as it did during its re-emergence in the 
late 1980s. Probably the first officially documented reoccurrence of 
Tsawasum was in the 65th session of the National Assembly in 1989, when 
the ‘anti-national’ conspiracy through distribution of pamphlets and 
booklets was discussed and officially defined as an act of treason against 
the Tsawasum.19 Keeping in tune with the act in the Khrims gzhung chen 
mo, all persons who went against the Tsawasum were branded as ngolops 
or ‘anti-nationals’ and Tsawasum were hailed as the trinity of Bhutanese 
nationhood. In the wake of the political crisis and armed conflicts in the 
southern districts, Tsawasum became an iconic political category which 
people cited so profusely as the cause to fight for. Loyalty and service to 
Tsawasum became the mantra to excite patriotism and nationalism in 
order to combat the threats posed by the crisis. It served as a buzzword 
which encapsulated everything that is Bhutanese and that Bhutan stood 
for. 
Tsawasum however soon suffered the same fate as driglam namzha in 
turning into a topic of empty rhetoric. People began to use it too 
frequently and lightly, often without even knowing what the Tsawasum 
are. As demonstrated by the anecdotes I have told above, most people are 
not aware of what the Tsawasum are and what significance they have. 
Many used it as an ingratiating slogan in their dealings with the King 
and the government. The welfare of Tsawasum became a new purpose for 
                                                          
16 lHo tsan ldan bkod pa’i zhing gi khrims gzhung chen mo, p. 136, n.p. n.d 
17 Personal communication 
18 See documents such as National Assembly Secretariat (1991), p. 2 
19 See National Assembly Secretariat (1989), p. 9 
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community endeavours, giving rise to the concern that Tsawasum is being 
used too excessively and smarmily, depreciating its value.20
The devaluation of Tsawasum at the hands of rhetoricians and 
sycophants is further compounded by the dearth of serious scholarship 
on the topic. Despite being a topic of national importance, Tsawasum 
remained a neglected topic with no proper study or analysis undertaken 
so as to build a firm philosophical grounding. The viability of Tsawasum 
as the trinity of Bhutanese nationhood was taken for granted and loyalty 
and service to Tsawasum were inculcated without adequate moral 
reasoning and justifications. This is perhaps acceptable in the current 
situation and fine to be left untouched out of benign neglect. 
Nevertheless, imagine, for instance, a scenario where the Tsawasum are in 
a conflict of interest and where simultaneous loyalty to all three become 
inconsistent and therefore cannot be sustained. Which of the three should 
take precedence? Should such a scenario arise, can the iconic triad even 
survive? Asking such questions are crucial to ensuring the credibility of 
our system, its plans, policies and visions, as most of them revolve round 
the theme of Tsawasum. 
A primary thrust of promoting Tsawasum and of slogans such as 
‘One Nation, One People’ appears to be the arousal of a fervent sense of 
nationalism. Yet, the very purpose and value of nationalism itself is 
ambiguous and a double-edged sword. Looking from a Buddhist 
perspective, sentient beings have the inborn inclination to love oneself 
and what is one’s own. This attachment, of all negative impulses, is the 
main cause of problems in the world and the root of the cycle of 
existence. To further inculcate this in people is a superfluous effort and is 
only adding fuel to the fire. 
Moreover, nationalism can lead to ethnic and regional particularism, 
religious sectarianism and ultimately individualism. Promoting 
nationalism in order to counteract an external threat can backfire in the 
form of internal segregation based on minor differences. The fanatical 
Hindu nationalism that wrecks our big neighbour India is a stark 
example of how nationalism that was nurtured and taught in order to 
oppose an external enemy has outlived the enemy, bringing so much 
discord and violence in the country. 
A similar sense of misgiving can also be felt with regard to our 
tendency for homogeneity that dictums like ‘One Nation, One people’ 
encourage. Homogenisation through the implementation of uniform 
values and customs, and standardization of localised variations, I have 
                                                          
20 I heard a senior citizen remark during the recess of last National Assembly session: “Even 
reciting the mDo mangs or performing a lha bsang is proclaimed to have been done in service to the 
Tsawasum nowadays.”  
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mentioned earlier, kills the spirit of tradition and subverts the policy of 
cultural preservation. Although it may serve some national interests 
temporarily, it will in the long run destroy the diverse spectrum of our 
priceless heritage. Thus, it is not a homogeneous and monotonous system 
that should form our future vision but unity in diversity and harmony 
within multiplicity. 
Now, to turn to some concluding words, it may perhaps be quite 
fitting to conclude my discussion of the themes with a story of Drukpa 
Kunley that I heard as a young boy from my father sitting by the family 
hearth. Drukpa Kunley was once circumambulating the Jokhang in Lhasa 
when he found a man meditating legs crossed and eyes shut. Upon 
enquiring, the man told Drukpa Kunley that he was practicing patience. 
Drukpa Kunley, as mischievous as always, repeated the same question 
every time he went round the Jokhang. The more he asked, the more 
agitated and angry the man became and at about the fifth round, the man 
chased Drukpa Kunley with vehement anger, while Drukpa Kunley ran 
about shouting “The practitioner of patience is coming to beat me”. 
Drukpa Kunley was a social and religious critic par excellence. With zest 
for humour and wit, he showed that the practice of patience is not about 
meditating crossed legged with eyes closed but about tolerating 
irritation, annoyance and hardship in every walk of life. This anecdote 
thus captures a vivid picture of how disparate verbal claims and applied 
practices can be and how the fruits of real purpose can be often obscured 
by the foliage of rhetorical speech. 
A major problem concerning the Bhutanese social themes also 
appears to be the disparity between word and deed. Mention is made of 
all the themes but mostly as insincere and rhetorical remarks to embellish 
orations and speeches. In spite of the repetitious use made almost to the 
extent of obfuscating other concrete issues, no proper measures have 
been taken either to give these issues a philosophical and moral layout 
and grounding or to systematically relate them to the frugal life of the 
villages. What moral and social purposes do the promotion of these as 
national themes serve? What pragmatic relevance do they have with 
respect to an individual, a family, a village and the nation as a whole? For 
themes of great value and national importance, there are too many 
assumptions unaccounted for and questions unanswered. Questions are 
indeed eternal; they are forever. Answers are only for now.21
                                                          
21 I owe this piece of wisdom to Prof. Richard Gombrich. 
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